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Tensions in the Middle East have reached new heights in 
recent months as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also 
known as IS or ISIL) seized further control over the Northern 
regions of these two countries. The Sunni extremist militant group 
appears intent on marching towards Baghdad, ousting current Iraqi 
Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and reforming Iraq and its 
neighbouring areas into a pro-Sunni Islamic state. ISIS also appears 
determined to execute any citizens in the region that will not 
convert to Islam and join their fight. Facing yet another crisis in 
Iraq, the United States cannot rely on the al-Abadi government and 
the Iraqi military to repel ISIS forces alone. After all, Al-Abadi 
only recently took office from former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki after his predecessor faced widespread criticism for 
dividing the country in favour of the Shia majority. 
Alternatively, the United States certainly cannot again risk 
committing significant American ground military divisions to such 
an uncertain and hostile situation in Iraq. Many commentators 
suggest rightly that the U.S. 2003 invasion of Iraq, the installation 
of a pro-American government and its later evacuation at least in 
part encouraged ISIS extremists to undertake its current aggressive 
campaign in the first place. Even then, the current ISIS threat has 
sparked U.S. military officials to begin talking about the possibility 
of escalation and reintervention. ‘[ISIS] is beyond anything we 
have seen, and we must prepare for everything,’ U.S. Defense 
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Secretary Chuck Hagel warned on 22 August 2014,  ‘and the only 
way you do that is that you take a cold, steely hard look at it and 
get ready.’ 
For the United States, ISIS presents difficult and limited 
policy choices. Returning U.S. combat forces to Iraq has been 
rejected categorically by U.S. President Barack Obama and his 
Secretary of State John Kerry, preferring to encourage local Iraqi 
and Kurdish forces to lead counter-offensives against ISIS. Obama 
proudly returned all U.S. combat forces from Iraq in 2011 and has 
repeatedly stressed that any new American campaigns there will be 
limited in scope. As part of this cautious approach, he has instead 
recently authorised a series of selected air strikes on ISIS targets in 
an effort to repel its advance and assist the Iraqi military to 
consolidate its forces as well as improve Iraqi morale. These 
airstrikes have been accompanied by humanitarian aid drops to 
fleeing Iraqi citizens. As of late August, the United States military 
has undertaken approximately ninety airstrikes on ISIS targets and 
in so doing assisted local Iraqi and Kurdish forces in retaking 
control of the Mosul Dam, an important piece of infrastructure in 
Northern Iraq.  
While it is unlikely that no American response short of 
another full-scale ground invasion or the deployment of nuclear 
weapons will be decisive in the short-term, the Obama 
Administration should be applauded for its cautious and 
incremental approach to the Iraqi Crisis. After the disastrous U.S. 
occupation of Iraq during the 2000s, the American public will 
certainly be anxious to avoid any further military involvement in 
the Middle East unless it is absolutely necessary to protect U.S. 
interests in the region. Past U.S. involvement in Iraq also 
demonstrated that there is no guarantee that future military 
involvement will ensure long-term, or even short-term, peace and 
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security for the embattled country. Even in light of the tragic news 
that American Journalist James Foley was beheaded by ISIS forces 
in direct retaliation to recent American bombing raids, that in itself 
should not be cause to escalate American military intervention 
beyond targeted airstrikes. 
Questions over reintervention in Iraq are dividing 
Americans deeply. Although there is strong support against 
American reintervention, terror acts like Foley’s execution changed 
American opinion over whether the United States should return to 
Iraq. A USA Today/Pew Research Center Poll conducted in August 
2014 suggested that approximately 40% of the public think that the 
United States bears a responsibility to ‘do something’ about the 
violence. This response was a noticeable increase from a poll 
conducted a month earlier, when the Center recorded data that 
about half of the country saw no U.S. responsibility to act.  
Even then, Americans who see a responsibility to act are 
still concerned over an expanded military commitment in Iraq less 
than three years after the United States withdrew its combat troops. 
The August poll suggested approximately 51% of people were 
more concerned that the U.S. will again entrench itself in Iraq. 
About a third of those polled, 32%, say that their greater concern is 
that the U.S. will not go far enough in stopping the Islamist 
militants. In short, there appears to be no solution that the Obama 
Administration can adopt that will cater to such deeply divided 
public views in America. 
What else, then, can the United States do short of 
redeploying ground forces? In conjunction with targeted airstrikes, 
Washington should also continue to assist the Iraqi military in 
surveillance, information gathering and strategic planning. So far, 
Obama has heeded this message in ‘leading from behind.’ Even 
before American warplanes were deployed, the United States sent 
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several hundred U.S. military advisers to train and support the Iraqi 
government in repelling the ISIS advance. Pentagon Spokesman 
Rear Admiral John Kirby also announced that the U.S. began air 
surveillance missions over Iraq—originally up to 35 per day, 
although this number is now increasing—to monitor ISIS 
movements. In conjunction with targeted airstrikes, these efforts 
are perhaps the best military courses of action available presently to 
the United States government relative to the financial cost and risk 
to American lives. 
The real major foreign policy problem, so far as the Obama 
Administration is concerned, is the lack of a broader post-
occupation strategy for Iraq and the Middle East since combat 
forces returned to the United States in 2011. The Administration 
has struggled to define what its overall mission objectives are in 
light of the new ISIS threat, other than to stress continually that 
U.S. ground forces will not be redeployed. This is where Obama’s 
cautious approach faces its biggest challenge: if Washington 
announces it is determined to defeat ISIS decisively it must 
necessarily escalate its military involvement because the current 
targeted airstrike campaign will not meet this goal. Yet, if the U.S. 
backs away from further involvement in Iraq, it will likewise be 
criticised for not doing enough to prevent what is now a severe 
humanitarian crisis. Alongside Foley’s execution, newspaper 
reports and social media discussions detail countless atrocities 
performed by ISIS militants against Iraqi citizens that is quickly 
reaching genocidal proportions, thereby prompting greater public 
demand that something more be done by the U.S. government. 
As part of this problem, the United States has lacked a 
policy that transcends national boundaries, especially when ISIS 
activities are not contained to one country. To address this 
shortcoming, one option is to work towards mutual agreement with 
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other regional actors on dealing with the ISIS threat, or at the very 
least, encourage policy solidarity on each country’s military and 
diplomatic efforts. For example, the ISIS threat presents a unique 
convergence of interests between the United States and Iran. 
Washington and Tehran rarely see eye to eye on strategic issues in 
the Middle East, although there is a growing consensus that ISIS 
represents a mutual security threat that might be dealt with co-
operatively. While the U.S. remains rightly unwilling to deploy 
combat forces, Iran has already sent Revolutionary Guard divisions 
into Iraq to safeguard Al-Abadi’s government and prevent the 
dissolution of the country into either sectarian factions or a pro-
Sunni extremist state. On the other side of the coin, the United 
States’ advanced military reconnaissance technologies offer Iraqi 
and Iranian forces surveillance support that both of their militaries 
currently lack. 
U.S.-Iranian cooperation, however small, should be 
welcomed. Increased bilateral dialogue between the two countries 
might repair some of the trust lost recently over the contentious 
development of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Co-operation 
might also provide a foundation for a future multinational 
agreement in the Middle East over a regional fight against terrorist 
organisations. However, if the United States government plans to 
work with the Iranians over a solution in Iraq, American 
policymakers must take an incremental approach and tread 
cautiously. Steps toward rapprochement with Iran would concern 
U.S. allies in the region and raise unwanted questions about the 
U.S. stance on Sunni and Shia political differences in the Middle 
East. As Obama warned on 19 June 2014, if Iranian intervention is 
based solely on ‘an armed force on behalf of the Shia and if it is 
framed in that fashion,’ the situation would most likely ‘worsen’ 
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and damage the prospects for long-term government stability in 
Iraq. 
Iran aside, recent remarks by the Chairman of the U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey suggest that combating the ISIS 
threat in Syria might present another option. ‘Can [ISIS] be 
defeated without addressing that part of the organization that 
resides in Syria? The answer is no,’ Dempsey said in late August. 
He added that ‘it requires a variety of instruments, only one small 
part of which is airstrikes’ in order to defeat ISIS. Dempsey did not 
go as far as to announce that the U.S. military might soon deploy 
forces there, but did say that in order to defeat ISIS, the United 
States must use ‘all of the tools of national power — diplomatic, 
economic, information, and military.’ 
The ISIS threat certainly presents another interesting and 
unique convergence of interests between the United States and 
Syria. Both countries have a direct interest in defeating ISIS, with 
the U.S. focused mainly on ISIS actions and movements in Iraq 
whereas the Syrian government, led by Bashar al-Assad, has 
stepped up raids against ISIS militants in its own country. The 
problem with approaching the ISIS threat from Syria, however, is 
that it is unlikely that substantial U.S.-Syrian cooperation could be 
reached. Washington has accused the al-Assad government of 
allowing ISIS to militarise in its early stages, while in return, Syria 
is angered by the U.S. support given to anti-government rebels in 
Damascus and remains sceptical of American intentions in the 
region. Moreover, it would certainly send a mixed public message 
for both governments to suddenly appear to be working together in 
light of the mutual hostility between one another during the 
ongoing Syrian Civil War. Nevertheless, any sort of regional 
cooperation should not be discounted entirely. Common ground 
might pave the way for finding a peaceful solution, or at the very 
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least, encourage better communication between the two countries. 
For now, ISIS is a mutual and growing threat to all governments 
with interests in the region. 
Alternatively, it might be possible to secure Israeli support 
for American action in Iraq in return for further military and 
diplomatic assistance in Gaza. The current Israeli-Palestinian Crisis 
has become another undesirable mark on Obama’s foreign policy 
record in the Middle East. His Administration has been accused 
strongly by the Republican Right of doing little to support Israel 
and finding a peaceful solution to the crisis after repeated attacks 
by both Israel and Hamas. While the situation in Israel is as equally 
delicate and volatile as the situation in Iraq—and, to be sure, there 
will be no simple solution to either one of these difficult crises—
working toward any form of mutual cooperation between the 
United States and Israel in Iraq should certainly be explored. 
American concerns over the situation in Israel are ever present, so 
for Obama, cooperation with Israel might even become a case of 
‘killing two birds with one stone’. 
In the end, the United States again finds itself caught 
between a rock and a hard place on policy options for Iraq and the 
Islamic State. There will simply be no straightforward or easy 
solution. On the one hand, doing nothing is not an option. U.S. 
targeted airstrikes are well underway even though there is no 
certainty that these efforts alone will force ISIS to crumble. 
Moreover, a failure to act opens the Obama Administration to 
domestic criticism over its inability to protect U.S. interests abroad 
and prevent a potential genocide. On the other hand, full scale 
military intervention would be too costly, risky, and unlikely to 
meet long-term U.S. objectives in Iraq. Uncertainty over Iranian 
and Syrian involvement also complicates matters further for 
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Washington, especially in any potential exchange of military 
information or cooperation.  
With minimal options available, the best course of action 
presently is continued selective airstrikes against ISIS targets and 
military assistance limited to ISIS surveillance and advising the 
Iraqi government. Cooperation with other regional actors should 
also be considered, but done so incrementally and cautiously. 
Cooperation with Israel is perhaps a viable option, although Israel 
is likely to be too preoccupied with the situation in its own country 
to send any significant aid to the U.S. cause in Iraq. Additionally, 
even though it is unlikely to occur at all, any covert American 
discussions with either the Iranian or Syrian government on ISIS 
should be treated just as cautiously as the current U.S. approach to 
Iraq. In any event, the ISIS threat continues to grow daily and the 
United States must decide quickly upon the response it will take. 
Hopefully, this response will be cautious, incremental and 
implemented through a broader strategic lens 
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